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OF INKBLOTS AND ORIGINALISM:
HISTORICAL AMBIGUITY AND THE CASE OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
KURT T. LASH*
Ever since Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut,' the Ninth Amendment has been a flashpoint in
debates over the merits of originalism as an interpretive theory.
Judge Bork's comparison of interpreting the Ninth Amendment
to reading a text obscured by an inkblot2 has been particularly
subjected to intense criticism.3 The metaphor has been attacked
as erasing the Ninth Amendment from the Constitution, and as
representing the inevitably selective and inconsistent use of
text and history by so-called originalists. 4
It turns out, however, that not only was Judge Bork right to
reject Justice Goldberg's reading of the Ninth Amendment, his
inkblot metaphor illustrates precisely the approach that a prin-
cipled originalist must take in the face of historical silence or
ambiguity. The more historical evidence that comes to light re-
garding the Ninth Amendment, the more Judge Bork's original
instincts have been vindicated.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN PRACTICE OF
ORIGINALISM
Originalism has evolved during the last several decades. Al-
though past formulations sometimes looked for the Founders'
* Professor of Law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 224 (1987)
(statement of Judge Robert H. Bork).
3. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1, 10-11, 80 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: De-
termining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT.
L. REV. 169, 192-93 (2003).
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intent, today the more sophisticated forms of originalism seek
the meaning of the text as it was likely understood by those
who added the provision to the Constitution.5
This emphasis on the original understanding of the ratifiers
can be traced back to the Founding generation itself. James
Madison, for example, expressly embraced the idea that the
meaning of the Constitution should reflect the understanding
of the state ratifying conventions.6 According to Madison, the
Constitution as proposed by its framers "was nothing more
than the draught of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life
and validity were breathed into it, by the voice of the people,
speaking through the several state conventions. '7
Madison's emphasis on the ratifiers' understanding reflects
the Founders' belief in popular sovereignty. A political theory
in ascendancy at the time of the Founding, popular sovereignty
distinguishes the government from the governed, with only the
latter having the sovereign right to establish (or amend) fun-
damental law.8 The governed speak as "the People" when they
meet in convention and debate, vote, and reduce to writing the
People's fundamental law. Because these conventions of the
People are responsible for "breathing life" into the document, it
is their understanding of the words that controls.
II. THE NINTH AMENDMENT
When it comes to the Ninth Amendment, the modem practice
of originalism might seem problematic because, for many years,
we had little information about its original meaning. The text of
the Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age others retained by the people."9 When Justice Goldberg
relied on this text in his Griswold concurrence, the consensus
5. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHrITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
6. James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty in the Fourth Congress (Apr. 6,
1796), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 263, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
7. Id.
8. For an elegant presentation of the development of popular sovereignty theory
in the early Republic, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1998).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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among scholars and jurists was that the Ninth Amendment
lacked any kind of identifiable and relevant history.10 Despite
the lack of historical evidence regarding its original understand-
ing and application, Justice Goldberg nevertheless concluded
that the "other rights" referred to by the Ninth Amendment in-
cluded libertarian rights, such as the right to privacy-and that
these rights were enforceable against the states. 1
Although neither the majority opinion in Griswold nor the
majority opinions in later privacy cases like Roe v. Wade12 was
actually premised on the Ninth Amendment, the Clause was
widely viewed as providing critical textual and rhetorical sup-
port for the right to privacy.13 It was perhaps inevitable, there-
fore, that the Ninth Amendment would become a subject of
intense examination when nominees to the Supreme Court ap-
peared before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
When the Committee asked Judge Bork about the Ninth
Amendment, he replied:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you
know something of what it means. For example, if you had
an amendment that says "Congress shall make no" and then
there is an inkblot and you cannot read the rest of it and that
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make
up what might be under the inkblot if you cannot read it.14
Notice that Judge Bork did not equate the Ninth Amendment
with an inkblot. He equated a judge confronting an ambiguous
text with an ambiguous history with a judge confronting an
inkblot. Throughout his testimony, Judge Bork spoke of being
open to new historical evidence. 5 Absent evidence of the origi-
nal understanding of the text, however, a principled originalist
judge has no authority to interfere with the political process.
Judicial authority is derived from and limited by the meaning
of the text as understood by those with the sovereign authority
10. See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 597, 598-99 (2005).
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Id. at 120-22, 129, 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
14. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 224 (1987)
(statement of Judge Robert H. Bork).
15. Id.
No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
to entrench fundamental law. Absent an understanding of the
people's sovereign will, courts lack authority to interfere with
the political process.
Nonetheless, when applied to the Ninth Amendment, Judge
Bork's approach seems to present a bit of a problem. Until very
recently, the consensus view was that the Ninth Amendment
was born in obscurity and drifted at sea for two hundred years
until washing up on Justice Goldberg's shore in 1965.16 If this
were true, then the Clause could never be applied -at least not
by a judge committed to the original understanding of the text.
Judge Bork's position thus appears to erase the Ninth Amend-
ment from the Constitution altogether- at least as an enforce-
able text.
The beauty of historical inquiry, however, is that the en-
deavor is cumulative-and the door is never closed on addi-
tional discovery. In the case of the Ninth Amendment, a
growing body of evidence uncovered in the last few years re-
veals that the "historical obscurity" model of the Ninth
Amendment is almost embarrassingly incorrect. 17 There are
literally hundreds of citations to, and discussions of, the Ninth
Amendment in federal and state court decisions throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.18 All of these
cases link the Ninth Amendment with the Tenth as together
establishing a zone of state autonomy.
This view goes all the way back to the Founding. The original
draftsman of the Ninth Amendment, James Madison, viewed
the Ninth as working alongside the Tenth Amendment in a
manner preserving the right to local self-government. In a
speech delivered to the House of Representatives while the Bill
of Rights remained pending in the States, Madison declared
that the Ninth Amendment represented a rule of strict con-
struction of federal power-one which preserved the people's
retained right to regulate local matters free from federal inter-
16. See Lash, supra note 10, at 598.
17. See Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 101 (2007); Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment,
93 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 10;
Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331
(2004).
18. See Lash, supra note 10.
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ference. 19 As Madison put it, the Tenth Amendment restricts
the federal government to the powers enumerated in the Con-
stitution, and the Ninth Amendment guards "against a latitude
of interpretation" when it comes to interpreting the scope of
those powers.20
Finally, there has been renewed scholarly interest in the first
Supreme Court opinion discussing the Ninth Amendment,
written by no less a judicial luminary than Justice Joseph Story.
In an opinion that remained influential for over a century, Jus-
tice Story described the Ninth Amendment as calling for the
preservation of concurrent state power whenever possible.21
All of this historical evidence reflects an original understand-
ing of the Ninth Amendment as a federalism provision protect-
ing the people's retained right to local self-government. It turns
out that the Founders were indeed committed to the protection
of natural rights -but they were even more committed to leav-
ing the protection of such retained rights to the people of the
several States.
None of this history was known at the time of Judge Bork's
confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, or
when Judge Bork repeated the same general view of the Ninth
Amendment in The Tempting of America.22 Even there, however,
Judge Bork tentatively suggested that the Ninth Amendment
might well be viewed as a companion to the Tenth in preserv-
ing rights placed in state constitutions.23 In general Judge Bork
concluded that the evidence simply did not then allow for any
definite conclusions-and certainly did not support Justice
Goldberg's reading of the Ninth Amendment in Griswold.24
In this, Judge Bork's instincts and approach have been vindi-
cated. Indeed, his position stands as an example of how an
originalist judge should approach a text whose history is either
ambiguous or missing altogether. When faced with such a
19. See James Madison, Speech on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the
United States (Feb. 2, 1791), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480, 489 (Jack Rakove
ed., 1999).
20. Id.
21. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 48-50 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
22. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 185 (1990).
23. Id.
24. Id.
No. 2]
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situation, the temptation is to associate the text with a higher
principle of some kind and proceed to enforce the principle.
But without history as a guide, a judge can only assume what
those principles might be -and the choice will almost certainly
reflect more personal predilection than historical accuracy.
The proper stance of an originalist judge in the face of his-
torical ambiguity, then, is one of humility. If the original mean-
ing of the text remains obscured, then courts lack authority to
use the text to interfere with the political process. Put another
way, in a case of historical ambiguity, the very legitimacy of
judicial review is obscured-as if by an inkblot.
In such a case, originalism calls for a judge to stay his hand
pending further investigation and analysis. Such an approach
does not ignore the text, much less erase it from the Constitu-
tion. It simply ensures that judicial action will be grounded
upon the identified sovereign will of the people themselves.
